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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LORIN J. ELLISON, HARRY G. ANDER-
SON and WILLIAM A. DAWSON, doing 
business as Famous Foods, a limited part-
nership, and BILL A. BA YES, administra-
tor with the Will annexed of the estate of 
Harry G. Anderson, deceased, 
- vs -
Plaintiffs and No. 10550 
Respondents, 
L.B. JOHNSON and LYMAN E. PASSEY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover 
money alleged to be due under a written contract 
for the sale of the remaining term of a leasehold to-
gether with certain store equipment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court granted Judgment Sua Sponte on the 
Pleadings and statement of counsel. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal and remand for trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The dispute before the court arises from the sale 
by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the remaining 
term of a lease on a store building, including fixtures 
and inventory, located at 1322 East 2100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
The owners of the property, T. E. Robinson and 
wife, had leased the land to the plaintiffs for a fifteen-
year term by a lease, dated August 14, 1947 upon 
the agreement of the Lessees to construct a store 
building thereon. (R. 39-43). The plaintiffs sold their 
leasehold interest to the defendant L.B. Johnson and 
to his son Merrill Johnson. This sale was terminated 
by an agreement dated November 1, 1955. It was 
agreed by the parties that the amount due on the 
L. B. Johnson-Merrill M. Johnson property lease 
agreement was $39,650.92. See Exhibit 1. 
The lease agreement sued on, Exhibit 1, was pr& 
pared by plaintiff Lorin J. Ellison who represented 
to the defendants that the monthly payments of $545 
for 29 months and the monthly payments of $445 per 
month thereafter would pay out the lease agre& 
ment during the term of the Robinson lease. (R. 69). 
The defendants paid each monthly payment until 
April 1, 1963 (R. 11-15). Although the term of the Rob-
inson lease expired on February 14, 1963, the d& 
fendants held over until April, 1963, when they were 
evicted. At the time the defendants were evicted the 
remaining payments on the lease agreement 
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amounted to $4778.35. The defendants refused to pay 
after their eviction from the premises and Lliis suit 
resulted. 
The plaintiffs filed suit to recover the payments 
which fell due after the eviction and the defendants 
answered alleging mutual mistake and failure of con-
sideration (R. 9-17). Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
iudgment (R. 21) based on an interrogatory (R. 18) 
was denied. The case was pre-tried (R. 28-30) and 
was set for trial. 
On the morning of the trial the court called a 
conference of counsel in chambers, a transcript of 
which is included in the record of this case. (R. 64-
75). After a short discussion of the case the trial judge 
stated: "The plaintiff may have judgment as prayed 
based on the pleadings and the statement of coun-
sel." The defendants thereupon made an offer of 
proof as follows: 
"MR. SKEEN: Well, now, in order to make a record, 
I would like to make an offer-
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SKEEN: -of proof. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. SKEEN: Comes now the defendants and offer 
to prove by the testimony of Lyman Passey, who is 
present in the courtroom, that the lease agreement 
sued upon in this case was prepared by the sellers, the 
plaintiffs; that Mr. Passey met with Mr. Ellison, one 
of the plaintiffs, at the A.G. or the O.P. Skaggs office, 
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and at that meeting a question was raised by Mr. El-
lison as to the amount of the monthly payments for 
the first twenty-nine months, and Mr. Ellison indi-
cated that the figure he had in the draft of lease was 
not sufficient to pay out the debt during the term of 
the Robinson lease which is dated August 14, 1947. 
Mr. Ellison with the approval of Mr. Passey there-
upon changed the monthly figure by increasing it and 
initialed it by the side of the agreement, and he stated 
that with that change the lease agreement sued upon 
would be paid out during the term of the Robinson 
lease. Mr. Passey accepted Mr. Ellison's word as to 
the computations because as obviously it was a verv 
detailed and complicated mathematical problem t~ 
figure out the amortization and the amount that 
would be paid on principal and interest each month 
and finally arrived at the payment of the amount the 
parties agreed to pay. 
MR. SKEEN: Back on the record. Defendants will 
-or offer to show by-also by the testimony of Mr. 
Passey that-well, here it is-that the extra pay· 
ments of a hundred dollars a month for twenty-nine 
months were calculated by Lorin Ellison to adequate-
ly pick up the delinquent payments under a previous 
contract dated February 16, 1952, between Famous 
Foods and L. B. Johnson and Merrill M. Johnson. I 
finally found that. I have it here." (R. 69, 71). 
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs 
as prayed, together with interest and attorneys' fees. 
The judgment is dated January 6, 1966, nunc pro 
tune as of January 5, 1966. Findings of Fact and Con· 
clusions of Law were signed and filed on January 
24, 1966. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The judgment is not supported by Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
5 
2. The court erred in denying a trial on the is-
sues of mutual mistake and partial failure of consid-
eration. 
3. Parol evidence was admissible. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW. 
The rule that Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law must be filed before the entry of judgment 
has long been established in Utah. Kahn vs. Central 
Smelting Co., 2 Utah 371, reversed on another point, 
102 U.S. 641, 26 Law. Ed. 266; Fisher vs. Emerson, 
15 Utah 517, 50 P. 619; Billings vs. Parsons, 17 Utah 
22, 53 P. 730. 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
"In all actions tried on the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless the 
same are waived, find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct 
the entry of the appropriate judgement ... Findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on 
decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other 
motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b) ." 
It is a matter of record that the case was before 
the court for a trial on the issues; that an offer of 
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proof was made by defendants and rejected; that no 
waiver was made by defendants; and that no motion 
was before the court. 
It is also a matter of record that the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on the 
24th day of January, 1966, 19 days after the judgment 
became effective. 
In addition it should be noted that what purport 
to be Findings of Fact are, except for finding No. 2 
concerning attorneys fees, in reality Conclusions of 
Law. 
It is apparent that the actions of the court pointed 
out above are breaches of the Rules which constitute 
reversible error. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING A TRIAL 
ON THE ISSUES OF MUTUAL MISTAKE AND PAR-
TIAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. 
The law is well settled that in case of a mutual 
mistake of a material fact a written instrument wiil 
be reformed by a court of equity to carry out the in-
tentions of the parties. 
The rule is stated by Williston as follows: 
"'Vhere a written agreement is not in conformi.ty 
with the actual intention of the parties in a material 
matter, a court of equity will reform the writin? in a.c-
cordance with that intention if innocent parties will 
not be affected thereby. The jurisdiction is confined 
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to writings, but as to them it is clear." 5 Williston 
on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Section 1547. 
This rule has been adopted and followed in 
Utah in several cases. Naisbitt vs. Hodges, 6 Utah 
2d, 116, 307 P.2d 620 (1957); Sine vs. Harper, 118 Utah 
415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950); Greene, Mistake in the Utah 
Law of Contracts, 7 Utah Law Review 304 (1961). 
In Sine vs. Harper, supra, a case in which a deed 
was reformed for a mutual mistake, Mr. Justice Lati-
mer explained the standard: 
"That evidence be clear and convincing does not re-
quire that it be undisputed in all details. It would be 
most unusual to have a trial on the merits where 
witnesses did not disagree on some of the circum-
stances, on parts of conversations, and on some of 
the facts. The test of clear and convincing is whether, 
taking the evidence as a whole, it preponderates to 
a convincing degree in favor of the plaintiffs. If it 
does, then it meets the test ... " 
In the present case the defendants offered to 
prove by a witness in the courtroom that it was the 
intention of both parties that the Lease Agreement 
sued on would be paid out by the end of the term 
of the Robinson Lease (R. 69, 71). This was obviously 
a material part of the agreement, and, in fact, a pri-
mary inducement for the contract. The payments of 
$545 per month for the first 29 months and the pay-
ments of $445 per month thereafter although net 
broken down as between rent for the building and 
Payment for the inventory and equipment, con-
tained a large rent component. This fact is evident 
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from a reading of the Robinson lease which required 
the Lessees (plaintiffs) to construct thereon an O.P. 
Skaggs system store with all costs of construction 
of the building to be paid by the Lessees. The lease 
provided further that Lessees would pay taxes to the 
extent of $500 per year, and that upon the termina-
tion of the lease the building would be the property 
of the Lessors. (R. 39-43). 
Under the Lease Agreement between the par-
ties hereto, Exhibit P-1, the defendants assumed the 
obligations of the Robinson lease and took posses-
sion of the inventory and fixtures. The surrounding 
circumstances indicate strongly that all parties in-
tended that the rent and purchase price of the in-
ventory and equipment would be paid out of the 
operation of the grocery store. 
The defendants made an offer of proof to show 
a mutual mistake of fact (namely, the intention that 
the Lease Agreement would be paid out upon the 
termination of the Robinson lease). That the Robin-
son lease terminated about 11 months before the 
pay-out on the Lease Agreement is evident from the 
fact that when the defendants were evicted from 
the premises unpaid installments at the rate of $445 
per month amounted to $4778.35. During this period 
of 11 months, the defendants would be required to 
pay rent on a building from which they had been 
evicted. 
This point was argued to the trial court (R. 65) 
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and was disposed of by the comment, "They have 
got no help coming because they would have just 
had to pay more each month." This was error be-
cause. in effect, it forced the defendants to continue 
to pay rent on a building from which they had been 
evicted. There was a partial failure of consideration. 
The injustice is evident and the defendants were 
entitled to a day in court and to equitable relief. A 
question might well be raised as to what equitable 
:-elief should be granted under the facts related 
above. The cases hold that the circumstances of each 
cc.se must be examined and justice should be done. 
See Greene, "Mistake in the Utah Law of Contracts", 
supra. One obvious item of relief should be the elim-
mation of the "rent component" from all payments 
after the eviction from the premises. 
We are aware that in a case involving mutual 
mistake a court of equity considers the circum-
stances of each case and particularly such matters 
as (1) negligence of the complaining party, and (2) 
whether an innocent third party will suffer if equita-
ble relief is granted. With respect to the first item 
the monthly payments for a period of nine years 
were to be applied, first, to accrued interest and, 
second, to the principal. The mathematical computa-
tion of an amount to be paid each month to pay out 
fae $39,650.92 during the period from November l, 
1955, to February 14, 1963, is involved and compli-
cated beyond the abilities of most people. Whether 
'he defendants were justified in relying upon the 
representations by the plaintiff, Lorin Ellison, tha: 
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the pay-out and the termination of the Robinson 
lease would occur at the same time is one of the 
questions which should have been considered by 
the trial court after hearing evidence. With respect 
to item (2) it is apparent that no third party would be 
adversely affected by the granting of equitable re-
lief. 
In any event, the defendants were entitled to 
the benefit of the rule of Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge 
Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561 
(1960): 
"A summary judgment must be supported by evi-
dence, admission and inferences which when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the loser shows that 
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.' Such showing must preclude all reas-
onable possibility that the loser could, if given a 
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sus-
tain a judgment in his favor." 
See also Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants submit that there is more than a 
"reasonable possibility" that they could produce evi-
dence that would support a judgment in their favor. 
3. PAROL EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE. 
The rejection of the defendants' offer of proof 
(R. 69, 71) cannot be sustained on the theory that it 
was not admissible under the parol evidence rule. 
The use of parol evidence to prove the exist-
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ence of a mutual mistake of fact is well established 
in Utah. In recognizing this, Mr. Justice Latimer for 
the court in Sine vs. Harper, supra, said: 
"Appellant is in error in her contention that testi-
mony concerning the mistake was inadmissible be-
cause it varied the terms of a written contract. If 
such a contention could be sustained, then the equit-
able theory of reformation of contracts would not 
apply to written instruments. The right to reform is 
given, at least in part, so as to make the written in-
strument express the bargain the parties previously 
orally agreed upon. When a writing is reformed, the 
result is that an oral agreement is by court decree 
made legally effective although at variance with the 
writings which the parties had agreed upon as a 
memorial of their bargain. The principle itself modi-
fies the parol evidence rule. 
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5 Section 1552, 
states the rule as follows: 
'The right of reformation whenever allowed is neces-
sarily an invasion of the parol evidence rule, since 
when equity reforms a writing it enforces an oral 
agreement at variance with the writing which the 
parties had agreed upon as a memorial of their bar-
gain. This limitation is necessary to work justice, and 
there seems no more reason to object to it in case 
of reformation than in case of recission for fraud or 
mii:;take. In either case unless the mistake precludes 
the existence of a contract at law, it should not be 
denied that the writing correctly states the actual 
contract or conveyance which has been made, but 
since it is inequitable to allow the enforcement of it, 
and since justice requires the substitution of another 
in its place, equity gives relief where reformation is 
appropriate, and to that end necessarily admits any 
relevant parol evidence.' " 
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CONCLUSION 
The court erred in denying a trial of the material 
issues of mutual mistake of fact and failure of con-
sideration, and in entering a judgment without sup. 
porting findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
must be reversed and the case remanded for a triai 
on the equitable issues presented by the pleadings. 
E. J. SKEEN 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
